A report on the September 2 collision of two Turkish vessels reveals ongoing search efforts and arrests of the captains involved.
On September 2, around 03:00, a preliminary expert report was prepared regarding the collision of two Turkish-flagged commercial vessels off Silivri. Search efforts for the 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' vessel, which sank as a result of the collision, and the 10 missing sailors are ongoing.
The investigation initiated by the Silivri Chief Public Prosecutor's Office continues following the collision between the Turkish-flagged commercial vessel 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu,' which was sailing from Kocaeli to Aliağa carrying rolled metal sheets and construction rebar, and the Turkish-flagged commercial vessel 'Alsu,' approximately 18 nautical miles south of Silivri. This incident resulted in the sinking of 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' and the inability to reach its 10-member crew.
In a statement from the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, it was noted that judicial proceedings have been initiated against 9 suspects regarding the incident that resulted in the collision of the vessels 'MT Alsu' and 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' operating in the Sea of Marmara and the sinking of 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu,' which had a crew of 10.
The statement highlighted the existing evidence obtained during the investigation and the preliminary assessment report prepared by the maritime accident expert committee, stating the following:
'It has been determined that suspect A.E., who served as the first captain of the M/T Alsu, failed to fulfill his oversight and supervision obligations regarding navigation safety, while suspect M.E., who served as the third captain and watch officer during the incident, did not take the necessary measures in a timely and effective manner to prevent the collision. Based on the current evidence and evaluations, suspects A.E. and M.E. have been arrested by the Magistrate's Court upon request for arrest for the charge of causing the death of multiple persons through negligence. Other suspects B.H., N.M., M.G., and S.A. have been released under judicial control measures. All necessary procedures are being meticulously carried out to reveal the material truth in every aspect within the scope of the ongoing investigation.'
The expert committee assigned for the investigation has completed its examination of the technical records obtained from the 'Alsu' vessel, ECDIS playback data, and reports provided by the Coast Guard Command and the General Directorate of Coastal Safety at the accident site.
In the preliminary assessment report prepared in this context, it was stated that as a result of the maritime accident that occurred around 03:13 on September 2 in the Traffic Separation Scheme of the Sea of Marmara, the vessel 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' sustained damage on the port side and sank rapidly, with no news from its crew.
The limited ECDIS playback data belonging to the 'Alsu' vessel, the log records at the time of the incident, the statements of the crew members, and the preliminary examination conducted within the framework of the Bridge Management Manual (BMM-Safe Navigation Handbook) were included in the report, which stated, 'The accident occurred due to both the violations of the bridge watch safety organization identified on M/T Alsu (Watch Condition B violation, leaving an inexperienced officer alone, lack of lookout) and the failure of the AIS device of the Tuğberk İmamoğlu vessel to operate adequately due to being turned off/broken or external interference, and the maneuvers performed in a dangerous starboard turn contrary to the currently available radio agreement, resulting in a bilateral significant loss of situational awareness.'
The report noted that immediately after the collision, the 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' vessel sank rapidly due to tearing on the port side, while only minor scratches were recorded on the starboard side of the 'Alsu' vessel, with no major damage that would impede navigation or cause flooding.
After the collision, the crew of the 'Alsu' vessel, along with elements from the General Directorate of Coastal Safety (including the Nene Hatun vessel) and the Coast Guard Command, conducted extensive search and rescue operations at sea, during which lifeboats belonging to the 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' vessel and a free-fall lifeboat were found floating in the sea in an empty condition.
According to the log records of the 'Alsu' vessel dated September 2 and the statements of Captain Ahmet Erarslan, it was reported that at the time of the accident, the weather conditions in the area were as follows: wind direction was north at 4 Beaufort (Bft) strength, sea state was 3 Beaufort with slight turbulence, and the sky was recorded as 'bc' (broken clouds).
In the expert report, it was stated, 'Visibility was clear and approximately 6 nautical miles. There was no fog, haze, heavy rain, or strong current in the area that would restrict maneuvering. Therefore, the accident occurred during a time when visibility and sea conditions were completely suitable for safe navigation. No external (natural) factor causing the accident has been identified.'
'The captain was able to reach the bridge 7-10 minutes after the accident.'
The report indicated that the analysis of the bridge crew of the 'Alsu' vessel and the personnel situation at the time of the incident revealed findings regarding judicial fault, which were presented as follows:
'Inexperienced watch officer: The only person on duty on the bridge at the time of the collision was the 2nd Officer (3rd Captain) Murat Evciman. From Evciman's official statement, it has been confirmed that he joined the vessel only one day before the accident (August 31) and that his watch from 00:00 to 04:00 was his first navigation watch on this vessel. Leaving a watch officer who has not yet familiarized himself with the vessel's maneuverability, crew, and bridge equipment alone in a busy traffic separation zone is a vulnerability.
Lack of lookout and helmsman: At around 03:13, when the accident occurred, there was no lookout, trainee, or helmsman (Watch A.B) on the bridge other than Murat Evciman. The officer was completely alone. Lookout trainee Yunus Türker and other personnel were resting in the cabin and on deck. This situation reduced situational awareness on the bridge.
Captain's absence from the bridge: Captain Ahmet Erarslan was not on the bridge during the accident; he was sleeping in his cabin. He woke up due to the impact of the collision and was only able to reach the bridge around 03:20 (7-10 minutes after the accident). In his statement, although he claimed that he had the authority not to have a lookout at sea, this situation is completely contrary to the vessel's SMS rules.'
The report emphasized that the 'Alsu' vessel had operational and systemic faults.
It was noted that the official Safe Navigation Handbook of the 'Alsu' vessel was examined, and a comparison was made between the bridge watch standards approved by the vessel's own company and the actual situation at the time of the accident, emphasizing that this comparison clearly revealed the operational and systemic fault on the 'Alsu' side.
In the technical examination of the ECDIS playback data of the 'Alsu' vessel, the chronological development stages of the collision were described in the report as follows:
'Maneuver phases:
1. Detection and invisibility (03:06): At a distance of 1.8 miles, the AIS data of the Tuğberk İmamoğlu vessel was not received, so it only appeared on Alsu's ECDIS screen as a radar echo (Missing Echo) at a course of 082° and a speed of 7.2 knots. The failure of the AIS to transmit data made identification and early passage planning impossible.
2. Radio agreement and course change (03:08-03:09): Alsu's 2nd Officer Murat Evciman stated that he established radio contact with the other vessel over VHF 16 and that upon the request from the other side to 'avoid port,' Alsu began to change its course towards port (at 03:09 to 294.5°).
3. Critical maneuver violation (03:10): While Alsu was changing its course to 283.9°, the Tuğberk İmamoğlu vessel suddenly disappeared from the ECDIS screen and reappeared about 0.5 miles away, and contrary to the radio agreement, it began to turn suddenly to starboard (its right).
4. According to the currently available data, final approach and collision (03:12-03:13): Tuğberk İmamoğlu changed its course to 133° at a distance of 0.25 miles and reduced its speed to 5.8 knots. ALSU was proceeding at a speed of 7.8 knots.'
The cause of the rapid sinking of the 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' vessel could not be determined.
The report stated, 'It is assessed that the Tuğberk İmamoğlu crossed the bow line of the Alsu vessel, colliding its own port (left) shoulder with the starboard (right) shoulder of the Alsu. The investigation and evaluation of why the Tuğberk İmamoğlu vessel sank so quickly after the collision will be possible with information and documents to be added to the file later. It is also necessary to investigate whether there was cargo shift or lashing deficiencies on the Tuğberk İmamoğlu vessel.'
In the expert report, the operational processes before, during, and after the accident were evaluated in light of judicial and technical evidence under the Maritime Collision Prevention Regulations (COLREG) and the Safety Management System (SMS), and the fault characteristics of the parties were explained based on the available data.
Accordingly, it was stated in the report that the 'Alsu' vessel violated lookout rules, noting the following:
'The vessel 'Alsu' did not have a helmsman or lookout on the bridge, except for a single officer, while crossing one of the busiest and riskiest traffic areas, the separation line. The rule requiring 'full lookout' to be conducted visually and via radar was clearly violated. This situation prevented the timely and early detection of the maneuver to turn to starboard, contrary to the radio agreement, and the reaction to perform a collision-avoidance maneuver.'
In terms of SMS regulation violations, the report stated, 'While it is mandated in the official BMM guide of the vessel to operate at 'Watch Condition B' level, the captain's absence from the bridge and the lack of assigned lookout personnel is an operational management deficiency. Captain Ahmet Erarslan failed to fulfill his oversight obligation by leaving navigation safety to an inexperienced officer.'
Regarding the violation of the Collision Avoidance Maneuver rule, the report stated:
'Watch officer Murat Evciman noticed that the other vessel was approaching and that it was turning to starboard contrary to the radio agreement at a very close distance of about 0.5 miles. At this stage, instead of taking early machine stop or full astern maneuver to prevent the collision, he continued to change the course to port. It is assessed that the failure to take early speed reduction or stop actions may have increased the physical severity of the collision.'
'The Tuğberk İmamoğlu created a serious navigation hazard by operating in 'ghost ship' mode.'
The report also included faults and violations from the perspective of the 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' vessel.
It was stated that the 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' vessel operated in 'ghost ship' mode due to its AIS device being turned off, malfunctioning, or not functioning adequately due to external interference, creating a serious navigation hazard for other vessels and VTS stations in the area, noting that the 'Alsu' vessel could only detect this target as a radar echo at a distance of 1.8 miles. This situation directly hindered early warning and safe passage planning.
The report indicated that although it was expressed in radio communications that the other vessel understood the need to avoid port, the sudden hard turn to starboard by the other vessel at the last 0.5 miles, cutting across the bow line of the 'Alsu,' was noted as an operational fault that physically initiated the accident.
In the evaluation section of the expert report, the cause of the accident was described as follows:
'The root cause of the collision and the subsequent sinking and crew loss tragedy is 'Bilateral bridge discipline failure, complete abandonment of watch standards, and loss of situational awareness.' The operation of the 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' vessel with its AIS device turned off and its sudden turn to starboard in the last 0.5 miles is an active triggering factor that physically initiated the collision. However, the underlying root cause behind the resulting tragedy is the bridge weaknesses on the Alsu vessel. If the Alsu had adhered to the 'Watch Condition B' rule in its safety guide (BMM) and had an experienced captain and an additional lookout on the bridge, the uncontrolled starboard turn maneuver of the Tuğberk İmamoğlu could have been detected at a distance of 1.5-1.8 miles instead of 0.5 miles, and in accordance with COLREG Rule 8, the machines could have been stopped immediately or an emergency astern maneuver could have been executed to completely prevent the collision or minimize the impact severity, thereby preventing the sinking of the Tuğberk İmamoğlu. The lone, inexperienced officer on the bridge was unable to analyze this situation in time, opening the door to loss of life/missing tragedy.'
So far, it has been noted in the VTS footage submitted to the file by the General Directorate of Coastal Safety that there is no visual record belonging to the 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' vessel. 'However, the Tuğberk İmamoğlu vessel was seen on the ECDIS screen of the Alsu vessel,' the report stated.
In the expert report, it was emphasized that due to the crew of the 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' vessel being missing at sea and the case potentially qualifying as 'causing death by negligence,' it is technically necessary to collect VHF radio voice recordings, expanded VTS radar and screen recordings, the stowage plan of the 'Tuğberk İmamoğlu' vessel, cargo securing certificates, loading port, loading time camera recordings, and stability calculations, as well as outdoor camera recordings of the 'Alsu' vessel through official correspondence to ensure that the material truth is established without leaving room for doubt.
Source: SeaNews Türkiye
