Captain Ulus Göker reveals critical findings on the Filo Jet tragedy, emphasizing the captain's failures during the crisis.
In the judicial process that has begun regarding the Filo Jet tragedy, Captain Ulus Göker, whose expertise has been consulted as an expert witness, spoke to Bugün Kıbrıs after his initial examinations.
Captain Ulus Göker, whose expertise has been sought in the investigation and the judicial process regarding the Filo Jet tragedy, shared the results of his initial examinations of documents and footage with Bugün Kıbrıs. He emphasized that the investigation is not yet complete and that he is waiting for some important documents.
Göker stated that the initial findings focused on the technical condition of the ship, the captain's behavior during the crisis, and the gaps in the oversight system. He noted that the captain did not slow down the ship, did not inform the passengers, and did not make a distress call. 'The simplest thing he could have done was to cut off the path. If the ship had been stopped, sinking could have been delayed, and passengers could have been evacuated in an orderly manner,' he said. Göker also revealed that the board responsible for inspecting ships has not been operational for years.
“THE CAPTAIN DID NOT DO WHAT HE WAS SUPPOSED TO DO” Criticizing the captain's command and control during the crisis with harsh words, Göker pointed out that passengers were not informed in a timely manner, the ship's speed was not reduced, and a regular evacuation plan was not implemented.
Göker stated, 'The captain abandoned the ship beforehand and did not inform the passengers. They were not told what they should do. Commanding and controlling the ship is not just about taking it from one point to another. If you are carrying passengers, you must provide the correct information during a crisis and manage the evacuation.'
“THE SIMPLEST THING HE COULD HAVE DONE WAS TO CUT OFF THE PATH” According to Göker, the first and most fundamental intervention that could have prevented the escalation of the tragedy was to immediately reduce the ship's speed.
Göker explained that they calculated the ship was moving at approximately 18-20 knots, and as the speed increased, the vessel was submerged more in the water, causing the damaged area to come into more intense contact with the waves.
Göker said: 'The simplest thing he could have done was to cut off the path. He would have stopped. If the ship had been stopped, sinking could have occurred much later. Passengers could have been informed, and everyone could have exited in an orderly manner. Perhaps no one would have been harmed.'
Göker pointed out that the captain's attempt to return may have further destabilized the ship, emphasizing that this is an assessment that still needs to be confirmed through technical examination.
“NO DISTRESS CALL WAS MADE” Göker also stated that the captain did not make a timely distress call, noting that the incident was reported only when a nearby sailor noticed the situation and informed the Coast Guard.
'After the orange lifeboats were seen in the water, the Coast Guard was notified. If the captain had made the distress call in time, the intervention could have started earlier,' Göker remarked, adding that the evacuation of passengers was not managed by the ship's personnel.
LIFEBOATS OPENED AUTOMATICALLY Göker explained that the lifeboats seen on the water in the footage were not deployed by the personnel in a planned manner but opened automatically due to pressure during the ship's listing and sinking.
He noted that there were eight lifeboats on the ship and that the visible life jacket capacity seemed to match the number of passengers, but the main issue was that no guidance was provided to the passengers on how to use this equipment.
Göker stated, 'People did not know what to do. They were not told where and how to wear the life jackets, which exit to go to, and which lifeboat to head towards. Everyone was trying to fend for themselves.'
“THE SHIP'S LOGBOOK COULD NOT BE REACHED” Göker indicated that one of the most important documents in the investigation is the ship's logbook, which has not yet been accessed.
He explained that developments on the ship, decisions made, and interventions by the captain should have been recorded in the logbook, and that the captain should have taken this document with him when he abandoned the ship.
Göker stated, 'The captain is the last to leave the ship. He takes the ship's documents, the personnel's documents, and the ship's logbook with him. However, the captain left the ship first, and the logbook was not taken. It becomes difficult to determine the minute-by-minute course of events without seeing the logbook.'
FOOTAGE FROM MAY IS IN THE FILE Göker emphasized the importance of passenger footage showing the moments when the Filo Jet took on water on May 21, noting that similar footage was found in the following months.
He explained that the ship was taken into a dry dock at the end of April, where mainly painting and routine maintenance operations were performed, and that an investigation is underway to determine when the damage that caused the water ingress occurred.
Göker said, 'The damage may have existed before May 21. We are comparing the repair reports of the ship and previous documents. At this stage, it is necessary to see all the documents to speak definitively.'
THE OVERSIGHT BOARD HAS NOT BEEN OPERATIONAL FOR YEARS One of the most striking points in Göker's statements was the fact that the oversight board responsible for checking the technical and operational conditions of ships has not been operational for years.
Göker explained that the board consists of a captain and a chief engineer, and that no new appointments have been made to replace retired members. He stated, 'There was a board that inspected ships flying the TRNC flag and those arriving at the ports. It evaluated the working conditions and safety of the ships. This board has not been operational for three, four, maybe five years. No one has been appointed to replace those who have retired. When there is no oversight, it becomes easier for unsuitable ships to operate.'
Göker emphasized that, in addition to the annual inspections conducted by classification societies, local and regular port inspections are also necessary.
HE DID NOT CONFIRM THE CLAIM OF TELEPHONE INTERVENTION FOR THE DEPARTURE PERMIT Regarding the claim that the ship was initially not granted a departure permit but that the document was signed following a phone call, Göker stated that he could not confirm this claim based on his discussions.
He noted that the departure document was prepared at 11:50, stating, 'I spoke with first-hand sources. There is no information that a phone instruction was given from the ministry or another authority. Another passenger ship also left the port on the same day.'
Göker explained that the port officer issued the seaworthiness certificate based on the ship's existing certifications and weather conditions, and that it is not part of routine procedures to technically re-inspect all sections of the ship unless there is a visible malfunction, report, or complaint.
EVALUATION OF THE HONDURAS DOCUMENT AS 'UNACCEPTABLE' Göker stated that he also examined the document issued by Honduras, noting that to make a definitive assessment regarding its authenticity, supporting documents need to be reviewed.
He explained that the document in question is a type of approval for the original qualification document issued by another country to be used on Honduran-flagged ships, and that it needs to be clarified why this document was accepted on the Filo Jet, which is flagged by the TRNC.
Göker remarked, 'This document can be used to work on a Honduran-flagged ship. However, the captain working on a TRNC-flagged ship should have had the original seafarer document and port book issued by the Republic of Turkey. I do not find it correct for the Honduras document to be accepted here.'
INSURANCE DOCUMENTS WERE ALSO REQUESTED Göker explained that the documents related to the ship's passenger liability insurance and hull and machinery insurance were not included in the file presented to him, and therefore he requested these documents from the company.
He stated that his expert report will address not only the actions of the captain but also the maintenance, repair, inspection, and insurance obligations of the shipowner. Göker said, 'It would not be correct to place all the responsibility on the captain. It should be investigated whether the shipowner was aware of the ship taking on water, whether the necessary repairs were made, and whether the captain had previously notified the company.'
Göker indicated that he will prepare his final technical assessment after reviewing the ship's maintenance and repair records, logbook, insurance policies, the captain's original qualification documents, and other documents.
Source: SeaNews Türkiye
