Dr. Cahit İstikbal: Consensus Essential for Maritime Agreements in Eastern Mediterranean

İstikbal: Signing an agreement in the Eastern Mediterranean does not end the field; it is necessary to produce consent.

International maritime law expert Dr. Captain Cahit İstikbal evaluated Turkey's call for a maritime jurisdiction agreement with Egypt on Habertürk TV's HT 360 program with Dilek Gül. According to İstikbal, notifying the United Nations does not mean acceptance; the agreement between two states makes the area disputed if a third state objects, and no international company invests in disputed areas. It is not possible to obtain a clear exclusive economic zone in the Eastern Mediterranean unless all coastal states agree.

After the Ministry of National Defense announced on October 28 that it was ready to sign an agreement with Egypt regarding the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas, the Eastern Mediterranean once again became the center of the agenda. The issue was discussed on the HT 360 program aired on Habertürk TV on October 30, 2026, with the participation of Beykent University faculty member Prof. Dr. Ece Baban and international maritime law expert Dr. Captain Cahit İstikbal. Host Dilek Gül summarized the importance of the discussion: These agreements affect where countries can claim rights at sea, how they can benefit from energy resources, and how the political power balance in the region will be shaped.

Ankara's call and Athens' reaction.

There are two developments behind the discussion. The Libyan House of Representatives approved the Memorandum of Understanding on the Delimitation of Maritime Jurisdiction Areas signed between Turkey and Libya on November 27, 2019, on October 20, 2026. Following this, the Ministry of National Defense reiterated that it was ready to sign a delimitation agreement with Egypt based on mutual interests. The ministry evaluated that if Egypt were to reach an agreement with Turkey, it would have more than 15,000 square kilometers of maritime jurisdiction area compared to a potential agreement with Greece (MSB's statement on Sinjar, Habertürk, October 28, 2026).

Berberakis: 'There is great unrest in Athens.'

The reaction from Greece was conveyed to the program by Habertürk's Athens correspondent Taki Berberakis. According to Berberakis, the possibility of Turkey signing a maritime jurisdiction agreement with Egypt after Libya is causing great unrest in Athens. The first expression of this came from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Minister Yorgos Yerapetritis stated that maritime jurisdiction agreements are not subject to auction. Berberakis interpreted this statement as a response to the Ministry of National Defense's assessment of 'more than 15,000 square kilometers.'

Berberakis also conveyed the approach of the Greek press, stating that newspapers highlighted comments suggesting Turkey presented an attractive offer to Egypt and sent a message to Cairo saying, 'Reaching an agreement with us will benefit you.' He recalled that Greece and Egypt signed only a partial agreement in 2020, limited to the 28th meridian, which is east of Rhodes, attributing this to Egypt's desire not to provoke Turkey at that time. Athens is now asking Cairo to return to the negotiating table to extend this agreement eastward. However, Greek commentators express their concerns, stating that Egypt's stance is unclear and that it has significant relations with Turkey. According to Berberakis, if Turkey and Egypt sign a maritime jurisdiction agreement, the region will move towards a stage where many of the issues are largely resolved.

Dilek Gül also relayed the words of Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis: 'The agreement ignores the existence of the Greek islands. Turkey and Libya act as if these islands do not exist.'

'No international company invests in disputed areas.'

In response to Dilek Gül's question, 'Will there be a deadlock here?' Dr. Captain Cahit İstikbal referred to the map of the Eastern Mediterranean shown in the studio. 'When we look there, we see that it has become a large knot of unresolved issues. Moreover, including the claimed areas, it is indeed a difficult area,' said İstikbal, pointing out a misconception in public opinion: 'No one should be under the wrong impression that 'Greece and Egypt have signed a maritime jurisdiction agreement; it is finished, it is theirs now' or 'we made an exclusive economic zone delimitation agreement with Libya.' The coordinates of that have not yet been fully determined. Only a border has been defined and notified.'

Notification to the UN does not mean acceptance.

İstikbal explained the legal meaning of submitting agreements to the United Nations as follows: 'Notifying the United Nations does not mean that the United Nations accepts it. It merely notes it. This is a notification made to inform other states. The United Nations does not have the authority to accept something that can override the consent of other states.'

The second misconception is the belief that the area agreed upon by two states now belongs to those states. According to İstikbal, the opposite occurs: 'When Greece and Egypt make an agreement, the area Turkey objects to becomes a disputed area. As long as Turkey does not consent, it is extremely difficult for an international company to come there and invest, to drill. No international company invests in such a disputed area.' Following this observation, a warning was issued to all regional countries: 'We all, referring to all regional countries, including Greece and Egypt, and ourselves, are turning this into a knot of unresolved issues.'

From passive to proactive from 2003 to 2019.

In response to the question of whether the new agreements triggered this deadlock, İstikbal answered, 'Of course, it triggers it,' and summarized the change in Turkey's stance. He recalled that during the period when the Greek Cypriot Administration made an agreement with Egypt in 2003, Turkey did not act very actively in these matters, and the continental shelf agreement with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was only signed years later. 'But in 2019, Turkey took a more proactive approach by signing a maritime jurisdiction agreement with Libya. This was first signed by the Western government; the East had not signed. When the House of Representatives approved it on October 20, both Egypt and Greece reacted.'

'Not invalid, but not recognized.'

İstikbal found Egypt's characterization of the agreement as 'invalid' legally incorrect, stating the correct definition: 'The agreement can never be invalid. Two states have signed this contract of their own free will, and the international treaty is valid. But they want to say, 'I do not recognize this.' That is the important part. When another state with boundaries within the same maritime area of 200 nautical miles says, 'I do not recognize this,' that maritime area automatically becomes a disputed maritime area.'

Full effect on islands and Egypt's line.

İstikbal linked the fundamental disagreement between Turkey and Greece to the issue of maritime jurisdiction areas of the islands: 'We argue that islands can have territorial waters, but there cannot be a maritime jurisdiction area outside of territorial waters. However, in the 2020 agreement between Greece and Egypt, full effect was given to the Greek islands. Therefore, there is a fundamental mismatch with Turkey's theses here.' He also recalled Turkey's stance on territorial waters: 6 nautical miles in the Aegean, 12 nautical miles in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

Emphasizing that the boundary drawn by Egypt does not overlap with Turkey's continental shelf, İstikbal noted, however, that there is still a problem: 'Egypt has stopped the boundary at a point that does not enter Turkey's maritime jurisdiction area to avoid conflict with Turkey. However, the portion remaining on the Greek side mostly falls within Turkey's maritime jurisdiction area. Even if Egypt does not want it, by indirectly approving Greece's view, it is taking a stance against Turkey's thesis.'

'Consent of four coastal states is required.'

In the last part of the program, Dilek Gül asked whether Egypt could afford to turn its back on Turkey's call and confront Ankara, and how the map could be clarified. İstikbal's response began with a principle: 'These matters cannot be easily resolved by saying, 'I made an agreement with him, this is finished.' Consent needs to be produced. If we include Libya, the consent of four coastal states is required here. It does not make much sense to carry out an operation contrary to the consent of one of these four coastal states. You gain priority, but what good is that priority?'

No unlocking without resolving Cyprus.

According to İstikbal, there are multiple locks in the region. In the east, the exclusive economic zone agreement between the Greek Cypriot Administration and Egypt is pending, and Turkey cannot consent to this without resolving the Cyprus issue. In the west, there are deep-rooted issues in the Aegean: 'We have deep-rooted problems like the territorial waters issue, the FIR line issue, and the continental shelf issue, which have now become gangrenous. There is not much meaning in making agreements here without resolving these issues. As long as Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration do not consent, the exclusive economic zone agreements that have been signed will not create a complete maritime jurisdiction area in international law. They will create disputed areas.'

The debate over 15,000 square kilometers.

İstikbal finds the area calculation highlighted by the Ministry of National Defense to be correct but adds a caveat: 'If Egypt had made an agreement with us, it could have gained 15,000 square kilometers more; if it had made an agreement with us instead of the Greek Cypriot Administration, it could have gained 11,500 square kilometers more on the Cyprus side. That is true. But let us not forget that if it had done so, these areas to be gained would still be disputed areas. Looking at the area that Egypt may have gained by making sacrifices, Egypt currently has no disputed areas. The disputed area is the area north of Egypt's line, that is, our area.'

İstikbal stated that there is only a narrow corridor left for an agreement with Egypt: 'There is a boundary line established by the agreement signed between the Greek Cypriot Administration and Egypt, and there is a boundary line established by the agreement signed between Greece and Egypt. We can make an exclusive economic zone agreement with Egypt in the area between them. However, if we establish that corridor according to the limits we set, there will still be a mismatch. An agreement with Turkey without changing the boundaries determined by Egypt with other contracts and without returning to the negotiating table with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration will create a strange maritime boundary there.'

'There is no unsolvable problem.'

İstikbal interpreted Egypt's stance as follows: 'Egypt does not want to confront us. We understand this from the boundaries it has set. We must maintain dialogue with Egypt, but we must not overlook dialogue with Greece. There is no unsolvable problem. Unless all coastal states consent, it is not possible for us to obtain a clear exclusive economic zone there.'

İstikbal concluded his remarks with a question he specifically noted was hypothetical: How do the great powers want to see the Mediterranean? A Mediterranean where problems are resolved and Turkey establishes its exclusive economic zones, or a Mediterranean where parties clash without fully engaging, problems remain unresolved, and energy is not extracted? 'As regional countries, we need to prioritize our own interests and be able to establish our own agreements.'

Baban: 'Proposals open the door to diplomacy.'

The other guest of the program, Prof. Dr. Ece Baban, explained Egypt's position in the equation with the logic of sovereign states: 'A state, under normal circumstances, prefers the agreement that will yield the most benefit for its interests.' According to Baban, it has been previously stated that Egypt is relinquishing rights it could gain through agreements with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration without even obtaining them, and that it could have much greater interests through an agreement with Turkey. The acceptance of the agreement by both sides in Libya and the improvement of Turkey-Egypt relations increase this possibility.

Baban reminded that the 2020 agreement between Greece and Egypt is located between the 26th and 28th degrees of longitude, stating that initially discussing an area that would not conflict with previously notified agreements to the United Nations could make the agreement more feasible. Regarding Greece's reaction, she spoke clearly: 'At the point where an agreement is made between Turkey and Egypt, whether Greece is disturbed or not is a matter concerning Greece. It is not a situation binding the two countries that made the agreement.'

However, Baban emphasized that there is no immediate solution or process for an immediate agreement, noting that Egypt's previous agreements and relationships will be constraining factors. 'Proposals are very important in terms of opening the door to diplomacy and regional gains,' said Baban, adding that the more agreements Turkey makes with coastal countries in this region and enforces valid agreements, the better it can protect its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. Baban also added that exclusive economic zone agreements should have started much earlier.

Dilek Gül closed the program with the following words: The statements, proposals, and calls in the Eastern Mediterranean are valuable for this area, and the topic will continue to be discussed.

Source: SeaNews Türkiye