The Trump administration's Hormuz blockade decision raises critical questions about its implications for Iran, global energy security, and international law.
Hormuz Blockade: A Strategic Mistake or Part of a Bigger Plan?
The Trump administration's decision to impose a blockade on the Strait of Hormuz has sparked a new axis of debate following the collapse of negotiations in Islamabad. Questions regarding whether the decision serves Iran's game plan, its status under international law, whether it targets China, and what it means for Europe and Turkey await answers.
Announcement of the Blockade and CENTCOM's Narrowing
U.S. President Donald Trump announced on April 12, 2026, that all vessels attempting to enter or exit the Strait of Hormuz would be placed under blockade following the unsuccessful negotiations in Pakistan. He also stated that any vessel that had paid a transit fee to Iran would be stopped in international waters. However, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) soon narrowed the scope of the decision: the blockade would only apply to vessels entering or exiting Iranian ports and coasts; vessels traveling to ports outside of Iran would not be obstructed. CENTCOM also announced that humanitarian aid shipments would be allowed to pass, subject to inspection.
Maritime lawyer Capt. Cahit İstikbal welcomed CENTCOM's correction but found it insufficient. İstikbal pointed out that Trump's initial statement, which encompassed the entire Persian Gulf in broad terms, was clearly contrary to international law. He emphasized that CENTCOM's statement limiting the blockade to Iranian ports and coasts was closer to the law of warring states but did not resolve the fundamental legal paradox of the blockade.
Blockade Without Declaration of War: A Legal Paradox
In international law, a blockade is an act of war that can only be invoked by warring states. However, the U.S. Congress has not made any declaration of war or authorization for the use of force; Trump has also carefully avoided the language of war in his official statements. This situation contains a deep contradiction within itself.
"When the U.S. says it will impose a blockade, it is effectively acknowledging that it is at war. But Congress has not declared war, and Trump does not mention war in his statements. This is a peculiar situation in terms of America's own domestic law: It has not declared war, yet a blockade is an international legal tool that can only be utilized by warring states." — Capt. Cahit İstikbal
According to İstikbal, there is another fundamental issue: Iran is the coastal state of Hormuz, not the U.S. He emphasized that the mandatory TSS navigation corridors are entirely located within Omani territorial waters and that the U.S. needs Oman's consent to operate in those waters, stating, "Iran is the coastal state there; America has no coastal status over Hormuz." Additionally, after the conflict began, Iran declared the usual TSS corridor in Omani waters as dangerous and announced a new route passing through its own waters. İstikbal characterized this move as Iran's attempt to present its traffic control as compliant with international law.
Does It Serve Iran's Game Plan?
At the center of Iran's strategy since the beginning of the conflict has been to close Hormuz, cutting off energy exports from the Gulf and spiking global oil prices. Journalist Gürkan Zengin argued that the U.S. blockade decision directly serves this goal.
"Iran's most significant move in its game plan was to close Hormuz. So what is America doing now? It says it will close it even more, and it will also close the ports that will call on yours. This is not a remedy for the wound; it is an opening that serves Iran's game plan." — Gürkan Zengin
Throughout the conflict, Iran had been granting passage to vessels from China, India, and Pakistan under certain conditions; it was reported that transit fees were also collected from these vessels in Chinese yuan. The U.S. blockade would also close this limited traffic, leading to a scenario where Hormuz would be completely closed to all commercial maritime traffic. İstikbal agreed with this conclusion, stating, "Hormuz will effectively be completely closed; this serves Iran's game plan."
Zengin also assessed the negotiation process from the same perspective. He emphasized that the 21-hour meeting in Islamabad was built on demands that Iran could never accept, such as the complete destruction of its nuclear program and the joint management of Hormuz, stating, "Saying let’s control Hormuz together means destroying the right of sovereignty. It was like when the Russians told Turkey after World War II, 'Let’s control the Straits together.' Iran is already winning the game on this ground; it is not losing the war." İstikbal also noted that the production of nuclear energy is the right of every country in the world, and the same imposition could be made on other countries, including Turkey, asserting that this approach lacks international legitimacy.
China as a Target: Gold, Oil, and Economic Competition
The most unique aspect of the debate was framed by İstikbal's focus on China. He reminded that 45-50% of China's crude oil imports transit through Hormuz, with Iranian oil accounting for 12-14% of that, highlighting that the blockade would directly affect China's energy supply. Zengin also emphasized that this scenario would escalate global tensions to another level.
"Are you going to stop Chinese vessels? Are you going to search them? You will escalate the tension to a global level. What harm will this do to Iran? It will be pleased. This time, you will start to confront China." — Gürkan Zengin
However, İstikbal proposed a broader strategic reading. He questioned whether the recent rise in gold prices and the current increase in oil prices are part of a coordinated U.S. strategy aimed at undermining China's economic competitiveness.
"First, we saw the rise in gold prices. Now it’s time for oil prices to rise. When we think of both together, could this be a strategic policy of America to put pressure on China’s economy and weaken its global competitiveness?" — Capt. Cahit İstikbal
Zengin placed the China dimension within a broader competitive framework. He questioned whether the Venezuela movement, the Greenland approach, and the current Iran crisis have all transformed into elements of global competition directed at China, stating, "There is a trade volume of $570 billion between the U.S. and China. There is a trade volume of $800 billion with Europe. They are so integrated that you cannot carry this."
"Great Reset": Resetting or Repositioning?
İstikbal provided the broadest analysis of the debate through the term "Great Reset," which Trump inadvertently mentioned in a speech. He noted that this concept is generally translated into Turkish as "büyük sıfırlama," whereas the word "reset" also carries meanings of repositioning and reestablishing.
"We only translate Reset as resetting, but the word also means repositioning and reestablishing. Trump’s slip of the tongue may not be a coincidence. Are they going to reset the world economy? Or are they going to make a big reset of the political structure in the world, starting with the UN? The answers to these questions are still unclear." — Capt. Cahit İstikbal
At this point, İstikbal explored two different reading possibilities. According to the first reading, the goal is economic: to reinforce dollar dominance, make the U.S. the center of the global energy market, and undermine China's competitive power. The simultaneous rise in gold and oil prices supports this scenario. According to the second reading, the goal is much broader and political: the restructuring of global governance institutions, particularly the UN. The tensions the U.S. has experienced with multilateral institutions over the past two years provide material for this reading. İstikbal left the question open: "It is still unclear whether they are pursuing an economic repositioning or a global political repositioning that will include the UN."
Europe's Difficult Situation: Does the U.S. Care?
One of the critical questions raised by İstikbal was related to Europe. He pointed out that the closure of Hormuz would deeply affect not only China but also the European economies that are largely dependent on Gulf energy supplies, posing the main question: Is the U.S. concerned about Europe falling into such a difficult position, or is it something it desires?
"Is the U.S. concerned about Europe falling into a difficult situation, or is it something it wants? Europeans need to stop following the United States and act according to their own strategic goals. The first two World Wars occurred because Europe was energy-poor. Now the third one is about to determine that." — Capt. Cahit İstikbal
İstikbal argued that Europe should establish its energy security based not on U.S. directives but on its own geographical and economic realities. He emphasized that Europe stands right next to Russia, can obtain natural gas and oil from there, but has excluded this option due to U.S. pressure and has had to turn to much more expensive alternatives. Zengin agreed, stating that without opening the Gulf, neither Europe nor Southeast Asia can resolve any of their issues.
"The U.S. has no special dependency on the region. But global economies are so integrated that are European economies independent of America? Are Southeast Asian economies independent of the American economy? As long as you cannot open the Gulf, you are in a position where no one can solve any of their issues." — Gürkan Zengin
Turkey's Position: The European System
One of the most striking parts of the debate was about Turkey's strategic positioning. İstikbal emphasized that the current crisis is not just about Iran or China; it represents a threat from a system that disregards sovereignty rights, which poses a threat "today to them, tomorrow to others, to all of us." Looking at Turkey's future from this perspective, İstikbal made a sharp strategic choice.
"Our place is neither the Far East, nor there, nor here. I believe we need to see our future not in NATO, but within the defense of Europe and the European system in the medium and long term. But we also need to work very hard in our lessons there. The current trajectory is not taking us to that point." — Capt. Cahit İstikbal
İstikbal substantiated this choice by emphasizing the necessity for Europe to establish its own defense. He stated that Europe must build its strategic autonomy independently of U.S.-led structures, and that Turkey is a natural part of this new European architecture in this process.
Sustainability and Next Steps
Both individuals agreed that the blockade is short-term. Zengin emphasized that the direction of oil prices in the coming weeks will test the sustainability of the decision.
"You can do this for 3 days, 5 days, 2 weeks, 3 weeks. After that, you will negotiate and talk to Iran. Is Iran going to surrender just because it lost oil revenues? Are you kidding? Are you joking? There is no such world." — Gürkan Zengin
İstikbal also clearly articulated the risks of the blockade on the ceasefire. He noted that if U.S. vessels approach too closely to Iranian shores, Iran might consider this a violation of sovereignty and open fire, which could reopen the door to full conflict. Both individuals view the Israeli factor as a constant risk and concurred that the fragile structure of the ceasefire has become even more delicate in the current scenario.
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz effectively went into action on Monday morning. The strategic consistency, legal legitimacy, and global impacts of the decision will be tested in the coming days. However, the debate clearly reveals that the issue of the strait has now become a crossroads not only of U.S.-Iran tensions but also of global energy security, Europe's strategic autonomy, Turkey's long-term position, and perhaps a much larger restructuring.
Source: SeaNews Türkiye
