Turkey may pursue a maritime agreement with Egypt, but must first address Greece's claims, according to expert Dr. Cahit İstikbal.
Can Turkey sign a maritime jurisdiction agreement similar to the one it signed with Libya with Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean? In response to Nurdan Ebru Erdoğan's question during the broadcast of Gün İçinden on November 2, 2026, international maritime law expert Dr. Cahit İstikbal stated that he finds Ankara's outreach to Cairo valuable. However, he emphasized that when discussing where the border will pass, Athens' claims must also be addressed. 'But the main party we should sit down with is Greece, much earlier than Egypt,' he said.
Cairo has two agreements on the table.
Erdoğan asked whether a common ground could be found with Egypt following the approval from eastern Libya. İstikbal explained that Egypt would not come to these talks with an empty map. Cairo signed an agreement with the Greek Cypriot side on February 17, 2003, determining the exclusive economic zone boundary. On August 6, 2020, it also defined a part of the maritime boundary with Greece. Therefore, in a meeting with Ankara, Cairo's obligations to its two separate neighbors will also come up for discussion.
In response to Erdoğan's question about whether Egypt needs to change its existing agreements to be able to reach an agreement with Turkey, İstikbal cited the impact of the islands on the boundary line. One of Turkey's objections is how much influence will be recognized when determining the maritime boundary concerning the Greek islands. The other is Ankara's non-recognition of the Greek Cypriot Administration. İstikbal stated that he does not see it possible for Turkey to accept the lines adopted in the two agreements as they are, and if a new line is to be agreed upon, the existing arrangements need to be reconsidered.
When asked what the diplomatic rapprochement between the two capitals could change, İstikbal said, 'Countries look at good relations, but they do not place their interests far behind these relations.' According to him, Egypt will seek a strong reason to change the assurance provided by exploring natural gas in an area where its neighbors recognize the boundary, to a broader area that may face objections to its use. Cairo's existing agreements have also been subject to objections. Libya opposed the 2020 agreement between Greece and Egypt in a note it submitted to the United Nations on May 27, 2025.
Ankara's account of two separate areas.
Erdoğan asked why Egypt preferred Greece if it could obtain a larger maritime area by agreeing with Turkey. The basis for the two contested figures is Ankara's statements made at different times. The Ministry of National Defense announced on October 28, 2026, that if Egypt were to agree with Turkey, it could have more than 15,000 square kilometers of additional maritime jurisdiction compared to a potential agreement with Greece. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, mentioned a difference of 11,500 square kilometers while evaluating the boundary drawn between Egypt and the Greek Cypriot side in 2003. Both figures depend on which boundary line is taken as a basis.
Ministry of National Defense statement · Foreign Affairs statement.
According to İstikbal, the difficulty arises when these lines are transferred from the map to the sea. If Ankara wants to propose an area to Egypt that no one will object to, it may have to compromise on the limits it advocates for its continental shelf. When Turkey maintains its own line, Greece's or the Greek Cypriot side's claims will continue. İstikbal explained this by saying, 'Unfortunately, our invitation to Egypt cannot promise an undisputed maritime area.'
An area unreachable by a drilling ship.
İstikbal recalled an incident that occurred off Cyprus in February 2018. The Saipem 12000 drilling vessel, working on behalf of the Italian energy company Eni, was unable to reach its target in block 3 southeast of the island. Eni announced on February 20 that the vessel was waiting to enter the area. İstikbal explained that the drilling vessel had to turn back after encountering Turkish warships. He illustrated with this example that a search permit granted by a coastal authority may not be sufficient to open a well at sea.
Eni's announcement · European Parliament inquiry document.
İstikbal also reminded of the Bern Agreement reached between Turkey and Greece in 1976 regarding exploration activities in the Aegean. Ankara claims that the agreement regarding the Aegean continental shelf negotiations remains valid. Athens, on the other hand, believes that its implementation ended in 1981 when negotiations ceased. İstikbal described the same issue from the perspective of fishermen. 'Even in fishing, they must come together and seek temporary solutions,' he said. He also outlined a path for oil and natural gas. The parties could discuss joint production in a specific area while keeping their views on the final boundary confidential. Articles 74 and 83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea foresee efforts for temporary arrangements while awaiting an agreement on the boundary, and that these should not affect the final boundary. According to İstikbal, the difficulty between Ankara and Athens is the concern that a step taken together could be interpreted as tacit approval of the other party's claim.
Egypt's gas needs and the European market.
For Cairo, there is also an aspect of this calculation related to domestic consumption. İstikbal emphasized that Egypt wants to use the gas it obtains from its own fields. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the supply gap in the domestic market has increased Egypt's liquefied natural gas imports. The country's average daily imports in 2025 are expected to be nearly four times that of 2024. İstikbal argued that the inability to produce Eastern Mediterranean gas also has implications for suppliers in the European market. He pointed out that Europe is receiving gas from the U.S. via ships, and he believes this situation benefits Washington. According to Eurostat, in 2025, the U.S. provided 56% of the liquefied natural gas imported by the European Union. According to İstikbal, countries in the Eastern Mediterranean will find opportunities to utilize these resources and transport them to Europe to the extent that they can agree among themselves.
Justification for the proposal to negotiate with Athens.
İstikbal expressed his support for being open to dialogue with Egypt, stating, 'It is always good to extend a hand.' In contrast, he mentioned that the claims that arise in the waters where a new boundary is considered are primarily between Turkey and Greece. According to him, proposing a broader area to Cairo will not automatically eliminate Athens' claim regarding that area. He also based his suggestion to first sit down with Greece on this rationale. Regarding the area around Cyprus, the issue of who will conduct the negotiations and in what capacity is a separate problem. İstikbal stated that starting maritime boundary negotiations with the Greek Cypriot Administration, which Ankara does not recognize, will also bring up the issue of recognition. He expressed that he finds it difficult to determine the exclusive economic zone boundary in this area without resolving the political dispute on the island. In response to Erdoğan's question about whether the agreement between the two states would be sufficient for energy and fishing activities, he referred to the example of Libya.
Scope of the approval in Libya.
Turkey and Libya's Government of National Accord signed a memorandum on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in Istanbul on November 27, 2019. The effective date recorded in the UN Treaty Collection is December 8, 2019, and the registration date is December 11, 2019. İstikbal explained the importance of the approval given by the Libyan House of Representatives on October 20, 2026, through the internal disagreements within Libya. The eastern parliament, which had previously opposed the signature of the government in Tripoli, also granting approval strengthens the political basis of the memorandum in Libya, according to him.
In response to Erdoğan's question about the practical implications of this decision at sea, İstikbal emphasized that the agreement between Turkey and Libya does not bind other coastal states that claim rights in the same waters. The reactions to the decision also illustrate this distinction. Ankara welcomed the decision of the Libyan Parliament. Athens reiterated its objection on October 20. Cairo announced on October 21 that the approval did not have legal consequences for Egypt.
The option of resorting to international justice if negotiations fail was also brought up during the broadcast. İstikbal mentioned the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg. He noted that there are concerns in Turkey about whether a fair decision could emerge from these bodies. The Tribunal's ability to examine a dispute depends on the existence of a jurisdictional basis in a treaty or an additional agreement.
Jurisdiction of the court.
According to İstikbal, what needs to be communicated to the public is what a signature can resolve at sea and what it leaves open. As long as countries claiming rights in the same area continue their objections, the activities of a fishing boat or a research vessel could again become a subject of dispute. 'We are not obtaining an undisputed maritime area without including all relevant coastal states in the agreements,' he said.
Source: SeaNews Türkiye
