Should Turkey's Bow Be Directed Towards Europe?

Let me reiterate the statement I made in that program on Habertürk: The conflict that erupted along the US-Israel-Iran axis has presented significant opportunities for Turkey; however, these opportunities cannot be understood or realized with the current mindset. A change in thinking is necessary. And the central question of this change in mindset is as follows: At this threshold where the multipolar order is being reshaped, where will the bow of the Turkish ship turn?

Eurasian Perspective

We face two centers of attraction. On one side is the 'Eurasian reflex,' articulated very effectively by Mr. Cem Gürdeniz: a line that sees Europe as a contemporary extension of the Crusader mentality, transforming the asymmetry of the Customs Union into a historical certificate of condemnation, and suggesting that Turkey should independentize its direction within its own basin. This line is partially justified in terms of the observations it contains. France's past stance of squeezing Turkey along the Greece-Egypt axis in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Union's double standards, and the effective freezing of membership negotiations — these are real facts.

However, the accuracy of the observations does not guarantee the correctness of the inferences. Causa cognoscendi and causa essendi are not the same thing. The problem with Europe's historical view of Turkey does not close all the paths leading to a strategic partnership. On the contrary, we are precisely at a historical moment where those paths are opening today.

Correctly Identifying the Perpetrator of the Stake Driven into Ukraine

To understand Europe's current fragility, one must first look at the true architect of the Ukraine issue. It is well known that the promise made to Russia at the end of the Cold War that 'NATO will not expand one inch eastward' is documented in many papers, from James Baker to Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The breach of this promise is not a coincidence; it is a strategy. The reasons and motivations behind the failure of the Minsk-I, Minsk-II, and the negotiations that approached the table in Istanbul just before February 2022 have now ceased to be a mystery in academic literature. The fact that the table was overturned after Boris Johnson's visit to Kiev is no longer speculation; it is recorded testimony.

Thus, the dominant actor in pushing the war towards inevitability is Washington. The strategic objective is clear: a Europe severed from Russian energy, condemned to expensive LNG for its industry, and whose competitiveness as a production base has been dulled. The fate of Nord Stream is a symbolic summary of this objective. Therefore, it is logically concluded that the US's conflict with Russia is ostensibly directed at Moscow; its real economic target is Europe.

This observation reverses the classical Atlanticist reading. And it is significant; because it is decisive in Turkey's preference.

Is Europe Becoming Wiser? The Meaning of France's Exit

The real question to be asked is: Has Europe seen this? It is seeing it, albeit late. Macron's discourse on 'strategic autonomy' has been gradually institutionalizing since the 2019 diagnosis of NATO's brain death. Following Germany's Zeitenwende trauma, the search for independent capacity in the defense industry, the EU's common arms fund, France's recent independent stance on the Ukraine issue from Washington, and even Poland's occasional shift towards this axis — all of these point to a single reality: Europe has become aware of the ally that is economically suffocating it.

The critical point here is: For Europe, Russia is not a military threat; it cannot be. Russia's conventional performance in Ukraine paints a caricature of a power that would cross the Polish line and march towards Berlin. Rational policy for Europe is to establish a commercial-energy modus vivendi with Russia. It is the US that dynamites this rationality. Europe's finally reading this equation represents a historical window for Turkey.

Framework for a Partnership of Interests for Turkey

Now, the issue is not the perspective of membership; that chapter — as Mr. Gürdeniz rightly pointed out — has closed in this conjuncture. The issue is a different version of the contractus societatis: a strategic alliance based on a partnership of interests. The groundwork for this partnership is ready:

First, the defense industry. Europe's arms agenda is a historical market for the defense capacity that Turkey has built over the last twenty years and also a means of integration. Mr. Gürdeniz's concerns about asymmetry in the Eurofighter issue are justified; however, the solution is not to avoid British supply but to participate as an equal partner in Europe's arms fund. Opening platforms like KAAN, ALTAY, and MİLGEM to the European market transforms asymmetry into symmetry.

Second, energy. Turkey is the sole gathering point for the Caspian-Eastern Mediterranean-Black Sea basins. For a Europe seeking alternatives to US LNG ships, Turkey is an indispensable corridor that must be negotiated.

Third, migration and security architecture. Europe's internal stability is effectively dependent on Turkey's border regime. This is a dependency that Europe does not want to accept but must live with.

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the post-Ukraine architecture. The security of the Black Sea, the continuity of the Montreux Convention, and regional stability cannot be envisioned without Turkey. Europe is finally acknowledging this reality.

History, Geography, and Reason

The mental framework that began with Europe's Crusades is undeniable. However, history is not a destiny governed by jus cogens. The reasoning that brought Germany into NATO at the very beginning of the Cold War transformed an equal partner into one that burned Stalingrad a generation earlier. Historical enmities are categories that can be retracted when the equation of interests changes.

Turkey's bow should neither be dragged behind the US flagship nor succumb to a blindness that pulls it to the edge of the Eurasian call. The bow should turn towards Europe — as it were, at this threshold where Europe is weakest and thus most in need of Turkey — in accordance with the rational requirements of our geography. This is not submission to the West; rather, it is the positioning of Turkey's strategic intellect in the void created by the West's internal conflict.

In a world where the US's economic target is Europe, Turkey is Europe's natural strategic ally. We must see this first; because we are in an age where the one who sees is at the table, and the one who does not see is on the menu.

Let us turn the bow towards Europe — but this time, let us steer the ship.

Source: SeaNews Türkiye