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This article emerged from a quest. The question I set out to answer was this: While the sympathy for England largely continues in the colonies left behind by the British, why do those living in the lands abandoned by the Ottomans not feel the same sympathy? This was a situation I personally observed in the field. Later, while searching for an answer to this question, a light bulb went off in my head. Yes, I said: Atatürk might have answered my question directly. Could it be? Atatürk was a clever representative of a generation that saw the deficiencies of the Ottoman Empire. The problems in the Ottoman Empire and how they should be solved were topics discussed among intellectuals at that time. It is likely that Atatürk provided answers to these questions in the new republic he established. Keeping this thought in mind, I approached the subject, and the following article emerged.
Let me present you with a paradox: Churchill, who was responsible for the death of three million people during the Bengal Famine, is still referred to as a "great statesman" in India today. The Ottoman Empire, however, is remembered as an "occupier" in the Arab world, despite having committed even a fraction of the economic exploitation that the British did. As a lawyer, when I investigated the reasons behind this perception difference, the picture that emerged constituted one of the most striking examples of legal sociology.
Let’s start with concrete data. According to the 2024 Global Soft Power Index, the United Kingdom ranks second in the world. The British Council's research is even more interesting: 86% of the 18-34 age group in India finds England "attractive." According to economic historian Angus Maddison's calculations, the British transferred £45 trillion from India between 1700 and 1950.
So, what about the Ottomans? According to the 2023 data from the Arab Barometer, 72% of Arab countries define the Ottoman period as "occupation." At Al-Azhar University in Egypt, the Ottoman period is taught as "el-ihtilal el-Osmani" (Ottoman occupation).
Where does this perception difference come from? This is where Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony comes into play. The Italian thinker argues that "consent production" is necessary for sustainable governance. To govern not by force, but by consent. The British succeeded in this, while the Ottomans did not.
Three fundamental elements are required to govern a society permanently. Think of it like a stool - if one leg is missing, it will topple over:
What did the British do? In 1835, Lord Macaulay's famous memorandum was published. Its purpose was clear: "We will create a class of Indians in blood and color, but English in taste and intellect." And they did.
Universities were established in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. The children of local elites were sent to Oxford and Cambridge. Today, the result is clear: India is the largest English-speaking country in the world. Graduating from St. Stephen's College in Delhi is more prestigious than from local universities.
Now let’s look at the Ottomans. More than half of Ottoman Turkish consisted of Arabic and Persian words. A paradoxical situation: The empire is Turkish, but its language is half Arabic and half Persian. Divan poetry is written in Persian, fatwas are given in Arabic. There is no systematic teaching of Turkish in the Arab provinces. The Ministry of Education was established in 1857, but it took until the 1880s to bring modern schools to Arab lands.
What could the Ottomans have done? Here lies Atatürk's answer: the Language Revolution. He made Turkish the language of science, switched to the Latin alphabet, and founded the Turkish Language Association. In other words, the Republic did what the Ottomans could not.
The British brought the common law system, the Westminster parliament, and modern bureaucracy to their colonies. These institutions were not just administrative tools; they became symbols of modernity and progress.
A striking quote from Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong: "The economic miracle would not have happened without the British legal system." Where does this gratitude towards the former colonial master come from? Because these institutions were internalized and embraced.
The Ottomans, on the other hand, made half-hearted reforms. With the Tanzimat, nizamiye courts were established, but sharia courts continued to operate. A dual structure emerged. The Mecelle was prepared, but it won the hearts of neither the scholars nor the modernists.
What could the alternative have been? Let’s look again at Atatürk's formula: radical and consistent reform. He took the Swiss Civil Code but adapted it to Turkish society. He ended the dual legal system. He established a modern, uniform legal order.
The British had the notion of "White Man's Burden." This concept, popularized by Rudyard Kipling's poetry, presented colonialism as a "sacred duty": "We bring civilization to uncivilized peoples."
Is it absurd? Yes. But was it effective? Absolutely. Local elites took pride in being part of this "civilization project." Even Gandhi went to London to study law at a young age. In the capital of the colonizer, he learned the law of the colonizer.
The Ottoman narrative was "adalet-i mülk" (justice of the state). A beautiful but static concept. It did not respond to the dynamic idea of "progress" of the modern age. Moreover, the Ottomans, who took the sacred relics and accepted the title of "Hadimü'l-Haremeyn" (Servant of the Two Holy Places), declared themselves not as hegemons but as servants.
So what could the alternative narrative have been? Atatürk's formula: "To rise to the level of contemporary civilizations." This was not just a slogan; it was a project for social transformation.
The most concrete example of Atatürk's vision was the Village Institutes. Do not see these institutions merely as simple teacher schools. They were laboratories for cultural transformation.
Imagine: A child in an Anatolian village listens to Beethoven's 9th Symphony, performs Shakespeare's Hamlet, and learns modern agricultural techniques. When he graduates, he returns to his village and does not just teach; he establishes a theater, organizes cooperatives, and opens a library.
This is true hegemony: transforming not by force, but by attraction. This is precisely what the British did in India. Playing cricket and having afternoon tea became symbols of prestige. No one forced anyone, but everyone wanted to.
Zülfü Livaneli's observation is very important: "The West's anger towards Turkey stems not from our modernization, but from our being an example to the Middle East."
What does "Bonne pour l'Orient" (sufficient for the East) mean? It refers to the low-standard governance model that the West deems appropriate for the Middle East. Let me explain with examples:
The Village Institutes threatened this paradigm. If a peasant in Turkey can listen to Beethoven, why can't a peasant in Egypt or Iran? That was the West's fear.
In 1954, the Village Institutes were closed. Coincidence? It was precisely the period when we entered NATO and received Marshall aid. What was opened in their place? Imam Hatip schools. The "Bonne pour l'Orient" paradigm was restored.
In British colonial literature, there is a type known as the "Brown sahib." This is perfectly depicted in the works of Nobel laureate V.S. Naipaul: native elites who look down on their own culture, exalt British culture, but are not fully accepted by the British.
There are similar types in Turkey's modernization history as well. Samuel Huntington's concept of "torn countries" explains this perfectly. Neither fully Western nor fully Eastern. This identity crisis makes society vulnerable to external interventions.
Mehmet Âkif's words should resonate in our ears: "History is nothing but repetition; if lessons were learned, would it repeat?"
Our proverb "He who knows the job, wears the sword" actually provides the formula for building hegemony. Not only power is needed (the sword), but also mechanisms that will legitimize and internalize that power (knowing the job).
The British knew how to do it: They exploited but also created admiration. The Ottomans did not know: They exploited little but gathered hatred. Atatürk found the formula: Village Institutes, language revolution, legal reform. We could not sustain it: The project remained unfinished.
The choice is ours: Either we will create our own unique model of modernity, or we will remain forever as extras in a story written by others.
As a lawyer, I can say that hegemony is first established in minds, then in institutions. And the way to win minds is not through force but through attraction, not through imposition but through consent production.
The British understood this 200 years ago. Have we still not grasped it?
Source: www.denizhaber.com