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Accident Analysis
Accidents
42
May 2013
The log ship Hanjin Bombay ran
aground in Tauranga harbour entrance on
June 21, 2010 after engine problems were
not communicated to the bridge, an inqui-
ry into the grounding of a cargo ship finds.
The fully loaded ship was leaving port
for Korea when its main engine began
overheating because of a malfunctioning
valve. The engine room crew did not tell
the bridge about the problem and began
attempting to fix it.
Unaware there was an issue, the bridge
team continued to take the ship towards
the entrance, increasing speed for the turn
from the Cutter Channel into the entrance
to improve steerage.
The engine-cooling water’s temperature
continued to rise and reached the point
where the engine safety control system
slowed the engine down, then shut it down
completely to prevent permanent damage.
The Hanjin Bombay was making the
right turn from the Cutter Channel into
No. 2 Reach when the engine shut down.
The loss of propulsion reduced the steer-
ing performance of the vessel and the rud-
der was unable to arrest the turn before the
ship left the channel and grounded on the
eastern shore near North West rock.
When the bridge alarms sounded but
the master did not tell the pilot what they
meant and did not translate the conversa-
tions he was having with engineers in
Korean.
When the pilot began asking why the
ship was slowing down instead of speed-
ing up, the captain didn’t tell him. Bridge
recordings reveal he was telling the offi-
cer at the forecastle to prepare to let the
anchors go.
The pilot was unable to learn from the
master what the problem was with the
main engine, so he radioed the tugs to
return and stand by to assist as soon as
possible.
The main engine shut down at about
7.58pm. Two minutes later the ship was
approaching NorthWest Rock light abeam
to starboard. The ship was in the main
channel moving at about 2.6 knots, with
the bow swinging towards shore and ran
aground at about 8.04pm.
The tugs arrived just after the Hanjin
Bombay grounded. They kept the ship
from swinging against the outgoing tide
and then against the incoming tide until
she re-floated about two hours later.
The Hanjin Bombay was holed in one
of its water-ballast tanks, dented the hull
plating in the bow area. There was no
pollution and the ship later re-entered
the port, where it underwent temporary
repairs before resuming its voyage. It later
entered a dry-dock in China to make per-
manent repairs.
The Transport Accident Investigation
Commission report says the grounding
could have been prevented if the automat-
ic engine-shutdown condition had been
overridden for long enough to stabilise the
heading of the vessel, and/or if the tugs
had been in attendance to help maintain
directional control.
Either option could have been achieved
through better knowledge of the engine
systems, better communication between
the bridge and engine room crew, and if
the bridge crew had informed the harbour
pilot of the escalating engine problem.
The TAIC report also says the Port of
Tauranga Ltd’s risk assessment for its
port, and Harbour Safety Management
system, did not fully address the risk of
departing vessels experiencing failure of
propulsion and manoeuvring systems at
critical locations in the entrance channel.
Its recommendations are that the
Director of Maritime New Zealand
resolve the safety issue of adequate tug
escorts for vessels in all New Zealand
ports, and that he develop a national sys-
tem allowing port authority staff access to
new and previous information on vessel
and crew performance in the interests of
preventing similar accidents and incidents
in the immediate future.
A key lesson is that shipboard opera-
tions must be conducted using an agreed
common language that everyone can
understand. Crew members lapsing into
their native tongue during an emergency
is a breakdown in communication that can
seriously hinder any response to deal with
the emergency.
The key lessons
from the inquiry
into this occurrence
were:
•vessel crews must
have a thorough
knowledge of their
vessels’ operating
systems if they are to
deal effectively with
abnormal situations
•the concept of
crew resource management must extend
to all operational areas on a vessel, and
in particular must result in a common
understanding of the voyage plan and
good communication between bridge and
engine room
• The level of tug assistance given to
vessels when transiting narrow channels
needs to be commensurate with the level
of risk and should be decided on the basis
of reducing the risk to as low as reason-
ably practicable
•shipboard operations must be conduct-
ed using an agreed common language that
everyone can understand. Crew members
lapsing into their native tongue during an
emergency is a breakdown in communica-
tion that can seriously hinder any response
to deal with the emergency.
n
Inquiry into a grounding:
Engine issues ground Hanjin
Bombay