The General Directorate of Maritime Affairs announced that a document has been issued under the scrap incentive framework for a new chemical tanker to be constructed, with the message of 'revitalizing the National Merchant Fleet.'

According to information reflected in sector news, this document was prepared for Transka Tanker, and the contract was signed by the General Director of Maritime Affairs, Ünal Baylan, and the General Manager of Akbaşoğlu Holding, Kemal Akbaşoğlu.

The scrap incentive is based on a framework that supports the construction of new ships to replace Turkish-flagged vessels that have been scrapped. The implementation proceeds through the 'Incentive Eligibility Certificate' and foresees the completion and registration of the new ship under certain time/conditions.

A critical condition is that the new ship must be constructed in Turkey, and the local contribution rate (including labor) must be at least 50%. It is essential to emphasize this condition: the goal of 'revitalizing the fleet' also aims to create jobs in the domestic shipbuilding ecosystem. (If there is an incentive at sea, it also means there is a shipyard on land.)

The scrap incentive regulations have been revised several times in recent years. For example, among the changes summarized, it was noted that the submission period for the new ship construction contract after the Incentive Eligibility Certificate has been extended from 4 months to 7 months.

Additionally, the update regarding the upper GT limit, changing from '25,000 GT → 50,000 GT,' has also been reflected in sector announcements.

At the beginning of 2026, the IMEAK Chamber of Shipping announced that a survey was being conducted to gather sector opinions regarding the scrap incentive application. This is a reasonable method if there is an intention to 'collect data from the field and redesign'; however, it should also be noted that a survey alone does not write regulations.

There are two strong justifications behind the discourse of scrap incentives: the aging of the fleet and environmental/energy transformation. Abdulkadir Uraloğlu shared data regarding the size and age of the fleet, emphasizing that the average age of ships is 21.4 years; he also highlighted that the new ships to be constructed with the incentive aim for environmentally friendly energy.

One of the comments under the announcement made on X brought the issue of competency definitions directly alongside the incentive news: Şahin Aktürk argued that the competency definitions in crew and pilot captain regulations should be updated in accordance with international frameworks, proposing a range of 1500–3000 GT for 'Limited Captain.'

Such 'another topic but...' remarks are frequently seen on social media; the navigation plan at sea is clear, while the route on X can change at any moment.

In the current regulation of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, it is clearly stated that the competency requirements for captains/deck officers will be determined separately according to the GT range of the ship:

Less than 500 GT (near coastal voyages),

500 GT (inclusive) – 3000 GT (exclusive),

3000 GT and above.

The same text also opens the door for the administration (practically the General Directorate of Maritime Affairs) to make changes to GT and kW values for certain reasons and to define some flexibilities in equipment.

The 'Limited Captain' competency is considered a separate competency level in the regulation; its conditions are also separately regulated (such as sea service, education, and examination).

This proposal technically imposes two challenges:

Firstly, it interferes with the GT threshold logic of the regulation. While the current threshold is 500/3000, raising the 'Limited Captain' to 1500–3000 enlarges the question of 'who/what competency will manage the 500–1500 range.' This range cannot be left empty; if filled, the structure of education, examination, and sea service will need to be rewritten from the beginning.

Secondly, the security logic of the term 'Limited' is opened to debate. The 1500–3000 GT range now exceeds the 'small vessel practicality' limit; it becomes a heavier class in terms of voyage safety, bridge workload, ship maneuvering characteristics, and emergency management. Such an expansion can only be justified by not just saying 'let the sector move forward,' but also by considering accident data, personnel supply, educational infrastructure, and inspection capacity. Otherwise, it starts as a good-natured 'facilitation' in the regulation but turns into a risk transfer in practice.

According to experts, the demand is understandable (every profession experiencing staffing/promotion bottlenecks would want this), but if it is granted without a clear impact analysis, the consequences could be severe.

The scrap incentive initiative aligns with a coherent state policy for fleet renewal and environmental transformation; the document issued today is a continuation of this line. However, it is also normal for the competency definitions of crew members to be continuously discussed according to 'field needs': if the ship modernizes while the human resources regulation remains static, the system will only operate on one leg.

What the administration needs to do is simple but labor-intensive: before adjusting the GT thresholds, address the trio of equipment-education-inspection together; test proposals (like 1500–3000) not as slogans but in the language of engineering and law. This is the only method that befits traditional maritime discipline.

Source: SeaNews Türkiye

Transka

Transka Receives Scrap Incentive Certificate to Boost Fleet